The Game: A Rational Actor Approach to the US-led Invasion of Iraq, 2003

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Authors: Tor G. Jakobsen ;Jo Jakobsen (Show Biographies)

DOI: 10.1080/09700160903064497

Publication Frequency: 6 issues per year

Published in:  Strategic Analysis, Volume 33, Issue 5 September 2009 , pages 664 - 674

Formats available: HTML (English) : PDF (English)

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Abstract This article employs game theory to explain the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq, seeking in particular to improve the understanding of why the Iraqi dictator chose a path of action that ultimately led to his downfall. The main argument is that Saddam Hussein lacked information about his opponent's payoffs and was lured by the possibility of becoming the undisputed leading figure of the Arabic world. The analysis shows that even if the threat of an allied attack in the end proved credible, Iraq could - quite rationally - have chosen to stand firm.